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I.  Introduction 
Legal systems have traditionally treated Family Law as different 
from other legal areas because of its attachment to culture.1  For a 
long time, the law was not the space to intervene in the intimate 
affairs of the family, leaving women and children mostly outside 
the scope of legal protection.  A clear example of this legal void was 
domestic violence, a concept that did not exist and a space which 
legal systems consistently claimed too intimate for public 
intervention.2  Judges have too often interpreted the rights to privacy 
and family as sanctuary spaces, where governments should not 
intervene, even to the detriment of some families and some family 
members.3  Since its origins, modern international human rights law 
included the right to family as inherent to each individual.4  This 
 
 1 Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: 
Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 753, 754 (2010). 
 2 See Reva B. Siegel, Civil Rights Reform in Historical Perspective: Regulating 
Marital Violence, in REDEFINING EQUALITY 29, 29–30 (Neal Devins & Davison M. 
Douglas eds., 1997); Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative 
and Privacy, 105 Yale L.J. 2117, 2118 (1996).  In the continental legal system, under the 
influence of the Napoleonic Code, many countries gave husbands legal power over their 
wives.  Italy was the first country to eliminate this power in 1865, but it maintained the 
husband as head of the household.  France only eliminated this power in 1938.  See 
WHITNEY CHADWICK & TIRZA TRUE LATIMER, Becoming Modern: Gender and Sexual 
Identity after World War I, in THE MODERN WOMAN REVISITED: PARIS BETWEEN WARS 3, 
16 n.16 (2003).  One of the last countries to remove the power of the husband over the 
wife in Latin America was Chile in 1989.  See Law No. 18.802, 23, MAYO 23, 1989, DIARIO 
OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). 
 3 Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2170–71 (1996) (“The criminal justice system regulated marital 
violence in this “therapeutic” framework for much of the twentieth century.  There was no 
formal immunity rule as in tort law, but the criminal justice system developed a set of 
formal procedures for handling marital violence—which it justified in the discourse of 
affective privacy—that provided informal immunity for the conduct in many 
circumstances.”). 
 4 See G.A. Res. 217 A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 73–74 (Dec. 
10, 1948) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the 
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recognition, however, was not designed to protect individuals from 
abuses within the family, and for many years it was not conducive 
to the recognition of families outside the heterosexual married 
family. 
Human rights systems have no specific definition of what type 
of family they protect or how to define the family that they intend 
to protect.5  Countries who subscribe to human rights instruments 
have their own specific visions of the family, and these visions 
sometimes clash with the rights these same instruments intend to 
protect.6  Even though regional and international treaties refer to the 
family as a unit, shielded from arbitrary state and private 
intervention, courts and treaty bodies created by those instruments 
have slowly recognized that the family is a space where human 
rights violations often occur.  This realization came through several 
cases in areas such as adoption, reproductive rights, custody, and 
violence.  Additionally, human rights adjudicative bodies have also 
started to think of the right to family outside biology and marriage, 
recognizing non-heterosexual and gender non-conforming 
individuals’ right to family. 
This Article argues that the Inter-American System of Human 
Rights (IASHR) has contributed to a family system that embraces 
gender equality and non-heterosexual and gender non-conforming 
families.  It argues that the system had, from its inception, an 
expansive idea of the family that included associations outside 
marriage.  This was the basis for a robust development of the 
concepts of equality and non-discrimination by the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR).  Although the IACtHR has only 
decided a handful of cases related to the non-heterosexual family, 
its rich case law on equality and the right to family is favorable to 
 
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. Men and women of 
full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry 
and to found a family. . . . The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society 
and is entitled to protection by society and the State.”). 
 5 See, e.g., Human Rights Council Res. 29/22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/29/22, at 1–
5 (July 3, 2015) (highlighting the UN’s protection of the family without specifically 
defining “family”). 
 6  See, e.g., Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala, Case 11.625, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 28/98, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. at 144 (1997) 
(demonstrating Guatemala had subscribed the ACHR and yet its definition of the family 
gave the husband authority over the wife when it came to work outside the household).  
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family diversity, including marriage equality.  The IASHR, 
however, must be careful not to fall into the trap of privileging the 
married family after so much progress towards family diversity.  
This risk is more apparent after the IACtHR issued a 2017 Advisory 
Opinion regarding trans rights and same-sex couples that focused 
heavily on the regulation of marriage.7 
Part II of this Article analyzes the origins and historical 
developments of the American Declaration of Human Rights 
(ADHR) and the American Convention of Human Rights (ACHR) 
vis-à-vis the family.8  It argues that from its origins the ADHR and 
the ACHR had the intention to treat married and unmarried families 
equally.  This section also analyzes the jurisprudence in the area of 
children’s rights and equality within the family.  Part III describes 
the development of the (IASHR) jurisprudence on the rights of 
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, trans, and intersex (LGBTI) individuals, 
arguing that its focus on family diversity has been instrumental for 
the development of the right to equality and non-discrimination.  
This section analyzes the Advisory Opinion AO-24/179 on trans 
rights and the rights of same-sex couples, arguing that although 
favorable to LGBTI rights, it missed the opportunity to stress the 
need for strong protection of trans individuals and family diversity 
beyond marriage.  Part IV presents some reflections about the risks 
of focusing too heavily on marriage equality to the detriment of the 
most common set of family associations in Latin America: the 
unmarried family. 
 
 7 See State Obligations Concerning Change of Name, Gender Identity, and Rights 
Derived from a Relationship between Same-Sex Couples (Interpretation and Scope of 
Articles 1(1), 3, 7, 11(2), 13, 17, 18 and 24, in relation to Article 1, of the American 
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
No. 24 (Nov. 24, 2017) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-24/17]. 
        8  See Organization of American States, American Declaration on the Rights and 
Duties of Man, O.A.S. G.A. Res. XXX, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc. 6 rev. 1 
(1948) [hereinafter ADHR], available 
at  http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/american-declaration-rights-duties-of-
man.pdf [https://perma.cc/UFG9-AZ8K]; see also Organization of American States, 
American Convention on Human Rights, “Pact of San Jose,” Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. 
No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR], available at 
https://www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/basic3.american%20convention.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5ZLC-9Y5W]. 
 9 Advisory Opinion AO-24/17, supra note 7. 
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II.  Family Diversity as a Human Right 
The Inter-American system of Human Rights (ISHR) started to 
take shape in 1945 at the Inter-American Conference on Problems 
of War and Peace, also known as the Chapultepec Conference.10  At 
that time, concepts such as “gender” and “sexuality” were foreign 
to legal systems and had not entered the realm of international 
human rights.11  It is no accident that the first human rights 
instrument in the Americas was called “American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man.”12  Although the American Declaration 
of Human Rights included the prohibition of discrimination on the 
basis of sex, there were no women drafters.13  Women had their own 
international processes in place through the Inter-American 
Commission of Women (CIM), which was created in the 1920s with 
the task of studying the situation of women in the region.14  Its main 
interest was to advance women’s suffrage.15  The CIM has been at 
the forefront of advancing women’s rights, including the drafting of 
the Belem do Para Convention.16  Despite its great contributions, the 
CIM has functioned on a separate track from the IASHR, which 
took many years to introduce women’s issues into its analysis and 
cases and even more time to think of sexuality in terms of human 
rights protections. 
 
 10 Robert K. Goldman, History and Action: the Inter-American Human Rights 
System and the Role of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 31 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 856, 858 (2009) (“The American states began shaping an incipient regional program 
for the protection of human rights at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War 
and Peace, the so-called Chapultepec Conference, convened in 1945 to consider the 
postwar directions of the Inter-American system.”). 
11 Terrell Carver, Gender, in POLITICAL CONCEPTS 169 (Richard Bellamy and Andrew 
Mason eds., 2003) (“gender” as a concept was only adopted into political theory in the 
1970s). 
 12 ADHR, supra note 8 (emphasis added). 
 13 See id. art. 2 (“All persons are equal before the law and have the rights and duties 
established in this Declaration, without discrimination as to race, sex, language, creed or 
any other factor.”). 
 14 ORGANIZACIÓN DE LOS ESTADOS AMERICANOS, COMISIÓN INTERAMERICANA DE 
MUJERES, A Brief History of the Inter-American Commission of Women 1, 1 
http://www.oas.org/en/cim/docs/BriefHistory[EN].pdf [https://perma.cc/E6XD-7MAJ]. 
 15 Id. at 4–5 (explaining the “Hemispheric Struggle for Women’s Suffrage” and 
CIM’s first goal in extending the vote to women). 
 16 Id. at 7 (highlighting that in April 1994, a “Special Assembly of CIM delegates” 
approved a draft of the Inter-American Convention on Women and Violence that was 
adopted by the General Assembly in Pará, Brazil in June 1994). 
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A.  The Family in the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man was 
adopted in Bogotá, Colombia by the Ninth International Conference 
of American States in 1948.17  It was the first instrument in the 
region aimed at guaranteeing the protection of human rights.18  
These events took place two months before the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.19  Both declarations 
provided a framework that, for the next couple of decades, allowed 
the drafting of binding instruments at universal and regional levels. 
Even though the drafting of the American Declaration took 
place almost simultaneously as the drafting of the Universal 
Declaration, both documents showed important differences in their 
treatment of the family.  Whereas the Universal Declaration focused 
on the right to marry, the American Declaration was silent on the 
topic of marriage and focused exclusively on the right to form a 
family.20 
The first Committee Draft of the Universal Declaration stated in 
Article 13: “Everyone has the right to contract marriage in 
accordance with the laws of the State.”21  It is surprising this 
statement passed as a right of any kind.  The Article openly 
recognized this right was subject to unrestricted government 
control.22  Country delegates, including the Inter-American Juridical 
Committee representing the Americas, suggested the first 
addendum to the first Draft, which included an opening paragraph 
on autonomy in family formation and a separate reference to 
marriage based on equality of husband and wife.23 
 
 17 ADHR, supra note 8. 
 18 Goldman, supra note 10, at 859–60. 
 19 Id. at 859. 
 20 See ADHR, supra note 8, art. 6 (specifying only the right to a family and its 
protection, with no mention of marriage). 
 21 Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Drafting Comm., Draft Outline of International Bill of 
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/3, at 6 (1947), 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/CN.4/AC.1/3 
[https://perma.cc/9A47-5Q85]. 
 22 See id. (emphasizing the language in Article 13 of the right to marriage as “in 
accordance with the laws of the State”). 
 23 Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Drafting Comm., Addendum to Draft Outline of 
International Bill of Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/3/Add.1 at 98 (1947), 
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The Delegates did not adopt this text.24  By the Drafting 
Committee’s Second Session, the draft of Article 13 was more 
specific.  It had more content, although again, the emphasis was on 
marriage, with the reference to the family still reading as an 
accessory to marriage.25  While maintaining its emphasis on 
protecting marriage, the final version of what became Article 16 of 
the Universal Declaration included a reference to the family as the 
basic structure of society: 
(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due 
to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and 
to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to 
marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. 
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full 
consent of the intending spouses. 
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of 
society and is entitled to protection by society and the 
State.26 
The American Declaration, unlike the Universal Declaration, 
focused exclusively on protecting the family: 
Article V. Every person has the right to the protection of the 
law against abusive attacks upon his honor, his reputation, 
and his private and family life.27 
Article VI.  Every person has the right to establish a family, 
the basic element of society, and to receive protection 
therefore.28 
Both declarations recognized, as part of the basic human rights 
canon, the right to form a family.  According to Johannes Morsink, 
the Universal Declaration’s emphasis on marriage seems to have 
 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/CN.4/AC.1/3/Add.1 
[https://perma.cc/7LG5-KT7X] (“Every person has the right to be free from interference 
in his family relations. . . .  [i]t is the duty of the State to respect and to protect the reciprocal 
rights of husband and wife on their mutual relations.”). 
 24 Comm’n on Hum. Rts. Drafting Comm., Report of the Drafting Committee to the 
Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/95 at 8 (1948) 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/CN.4/95 
[https://perma.cc/7BS8-5ULE]. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See UDHR, supra note 4.  
27 Id. art. 5. 
 28 ADHR, supra note 8, art. 6. 
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had at least three motivations.29  First, an opposition to Nazi ideas 
that denied interracial marriage;30 second, a discussion about the 
role of marriage in family formation;31 and third, the need for 
compromise about the place of divorce in the Declaration.32  
Divorce was a point of conflict between groups with strong 
Christian beliefs and delegations representing secular interests.33  
While the first group viewed marriage as an institution without 
dissolution, the second group considered it important to treat 
marriage as a secular institution subject to divorce laws.34 
The recognition of family units formed outside marriage was a 
point of disagreement.  The Lebanese delegate’s proposal illustrates 
the tension: “The family deriving from marriage is the natural and 
fundamental group unit of society.  It is endowed by the Creator 
with inalienable rights antecedent to all positive law . . . .”35  
Similarly, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics “thought there was no purpose in laying down that the 
family was based on marriage because it could hardly be based upon 
anything else.”36  Although no delegate was advocating for a broad 
interpretation of the family outside marriage, some were concerned 
with guaranteeing equal treatment of children born within or outside 
marriage, indirectly recognizing the existence of the family outside 
marriage.37  In line with the lack of representation of sexual diversity 
at the time, the drafters did not have a family outside heterosexual 
norms in mind.  According to Morsink, however, at least one 
delegate, from Uruguay, stated that omitting references to marriage 
 
 29 JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ORIGINS, 
DRAFTING AND INTENT (1999). 
 30 See id. at 88 (“The stipulation that ‘marriage shall be entered into only with the 
free and full consent of the intending spouses’ was meant to cut out the role of both religion 
and the state and stands in clear contrast to Hitler’s pronouncements in Mein Kampf, where 
he denied that marriage was ‘the holiest of human rights.’”). 
 31 See id. at 254. 
 32 See id. at 121–122. 
 33 See id. at 121–125. 
 34 See id. 
 35 MORSINK, supra note 29, at 284. 
 36 See U.N. Economic and Social Council, 2nd Sess., 38th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/AC.1/SR.38 (May 18, 1948), http://hr-
travaux.law.virginia.edu/document/iccpr/ecn4ac1sr38/nid-1689 [https://perma.cc/33JA-
V5B7]. 
 37 Id. at 10.  
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could provide protection to those “whose sexual inclination is not 
heterosexual.”38 
Contrary to the drafting of the Universal Declaration, the 
drafters of the American Declaration did not discuss the right to 
marriage.39  Additionally, the American Declaration included a 
special protection for pregnant women and children consistent with 
labor protections at the time of drafting.40 
B.  The Family in the American Convention of Human Rights 
The American Convention of Human Rights (ACHR) was 
adopted in 1969, and it entered into force in 1978.41  The Convention 
resembled the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) that had been drafted three years earlier, and the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, better known as the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), drafted in 1950 and in force since 1953.42 
The ACHR, similar to the ICCPR and the ECHR, refers to the 
family in two dimensions.  The first dimension is within the right to 
privacy and reflects the traditional idea of the family as shielded 
from state intervention.  The ACHR states in Article 11.2 that “[n]o 
one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his 
private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of 
unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation.”43  This Article is 
 
 38 MORSINK, supra note 29, at 256. 
 39 Alvaro Paúl, Los Trabajos Preparatorios de la Declaración Americana de los 
Derechos y Deberes del Hombre y del Origen Remoto de la Corte Interamericana, XXV 
(2017), available at https://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/bjv/detalle-libro/4660-los-trabajos-
preparatorios-de-la-declaracion-americana-de-los-derechos-y-deberes-del-hombre-y-el-
origen-remoto-de-la-corte-interamericana [https://perma.cc/6TB6-Y4KZ].  
 40 See, e.g., Elizabeth Hutchison, “La Defensa de las “Hijas del Pueblo,” in 
DISCIPLINA Y DESACATO: CONSTRUCCION DE IDENTIDAD EN CHILE, SIGLOS XIX Y XX 266 
(Lorena Godoy et al. eds., 1995); see also FERNANDO ORTIZ LETELIER, EL MOVIMIENTO 
OBRERO EN CHILE (1891-1919) 147 (2005).  
 41 Cecilia Medina Quiroga, Los 40 años de la Convención Americana sobre 
Derechos Humanos a la luz de cierta jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana, ANUARIO 




 42 Id. at 16. 
 43 ACHR, supra note 8, at art. 11.2. 
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similar to ICCPR’s Article 17.44  The second dimension refers to the 
right to form a family.45  Article 17 of the ACHR and Article 23 of 
the ICCPR are very similar.  Both texts recognized the family as the 
natural and fundamental unit in society with no mention of 
marriage.46  Both referred to the right of men and women to marry 
and form a family.47  The ACHR uses, in English, the sentence “to 
raise a family” while the ICCPR uses “to found a family.”  Both 
documents in Spanish, however, use the same sentence “a fundar 
una familia.”48  The ACHR, however, added paragraphs that 
resulted in a more robust protection to the family and the basis for 
case law strengthening the protection of families outside the 
heterosexual married couple.49   
The ACHR, added two elements not included in the ICCPR.  
First, it conditioned legal regulations for the celebration of marriage 
to the principle of non-discrimination, and it provided a condition 
of equality within marriage to get the protection of the Convention.50  
It also covered more types of families than the text of the ICCPR.51  
Additionally, the American Convention protects the right of women 
and men to marry and the right to found a family under the 
conditions set forth in their own countries.52  These rights, however, 
are protected as long as those conditions do not go against the 
Convention’s principle of non-discrimination.  Under the ACHR 
children also have the same right to family, regardless of their 
parents’ marital status.53  The ACHR, therefore, since its origins, 
formally protects some family connection outside of the 
traditionally married family. 
Regarding underage marriage, the Convention did not expressly 
 
 44 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx [https://perma.cc/42LX-
KDQP]. 
 45 ACHR, supra note 8, at art. 17. 
46  See id.; see ICCPR, supra note 44, at art. 23. 
 47 See ACHR, supra note 8; see ICCPR, supra note 44.  
48  ACHR, supra note 8, at art 17.   
49  See id. 
 50 See id.; see Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala, Case 11.625, Inter-
Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 4/01, at 7–8 (Jan. 19, 2001). 
 51 See ACHR, supra note 8, at art. 17. 
 52 See id. at art. 17.4. 
 53 See id. at art. 17.5. 
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prohibit it, even though the third paragraph of Article 17 states that 
marriage could only occur if the parties freely consented to it.54  This 
position followed the legal framework of the majority of countries 
in Latin America and the world.55  The focus on the prohibition of 
underage marriage came some years later, and thanks to other 
human rights instruments, the international human rights 
community is pushing for eliminating underage marriage.56 
Despite its shortcomings, since its origins the ACHR 
subordinated marriage regulations and the right to raise a family to 
the principle of non-discrimination.  This is a key element for the 
progressive inclusion and equality of treatment of non-heterosexual 
families in the region. 
The most important innovation of the American Convention 
was the right of children, born out of wedlock, to equal treatment.57  
Consistently throughout history, Latin America and the Caribbean 
have had low marriage rates and high rates of children born out of 
wedlock.58  Unlike the ICCPR and the ECHR, the ACHR clarified 
 
 54 See id. art. 17. 
 55 ROCÍO ROSERO GARCÉS & CECILIA VALDIVIESO VEGA, REFORMING THE 
LEGISLATION ON THE AGE OF MARRIAGE: SUCCESSFUL EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS 
LEARNED FROM LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 7 (2016), 
http://onusidalac.org/1/images/2016/onu-matrimonio-infantil-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AXH3-G99G] (stating 30% of women between the ages of 20 and 49 in 
Latin America and the Caribbean were married or entered into a union before the age of 
18, while 18% married before the age of 15). 
 56 See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) art. 16.2, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 20378 (Sept. 3, 1981), 
available at https://www.ohchr.org/documents/professionalinterest/cedaw.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A3K6-CJFC]; Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, General Recommendation No. 21: Equality in Marriage and Family Relations, 
art. 36 (1994), available at  
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/1_Global/A_49_38
(SUPP)_4733_E.pdf  [https://perma.cc/VT3U-CRAN]; Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
Joint General Recommendation/General Comment No. 31, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/31-
CRC/C/GC/18 (Nov. 14, 2014) (stating that in exceptional cases judicial authorities may 
approve marriage by minors, provided that they have reached 16 years). 
 57 See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & ROBERT NORRIS, HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM 14 (1982). 
 58 Nina Milanich, To Make All Children Equal is a Change in the Power Structures 
of Society: The Politics of Family Law in Twentieth Century Chile and Latin America, 33 
LAW AND HIST. REV. 767, 774 (2015) (“By the turn of the twentieth century, Latin America 
had the lowest marriage rates and highest illegitimacy rates in the world”) (citing GÖRAN 
THERBORN, BETWEEN SEX AND POWER: FAMILY IN THE WORLD, 1900–2000 156 (2004))). 
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that treating legitimate and illegitimate children differently violated 
the right to family.59  Many years passed before the right to equal 
treatment between legitimate and illegitimate children became the 
general rule in the region.60  The American Convention, however, 
recognized children’s equality, regardless of parents’ civil status, as 
a basic human right.  The ECHR, on the contrary, had no similar 
provision, and it recognized this right through case law in 1979.61 
Article 15 of the Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights “Protocol of San Salvador” complements Article 17 
of the Convention.62  Additionally, Article 15 states that the family 
is the foundation of society and that “everyone has the right to form 
a family, which shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions 
of the pertinent domestic legislation.”63  Once more, the right to 
marry is not mentioned, even though it links the right to family to 
local legislations, indirectly creating restrictions to unmarried 
families.  
C.  The Family Through the Jurisprudence of the Inter-
American System of Human Rights 
The IACtHR has a rich jurisprudence on the right to privacy 
involving the family.64  Several of the IACtHR’s decisions provided 
 
 59 ACHR, supra note 8, at art. 17. 
 60 For a historical account on regulation of illegitimacy in Latin America, see 
Milanich, supra note 58, at 774 (citing THERBORN, supra note 58). 
 61 Marckx v. Belgium, App. No. 6833/74, Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 13, 1979), available 
at https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,3ae6b7014.html [https://perma.cc/PY8M-
C8ZL]. 
 62 See Organization of American States, Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 





 63 Id. 
 64 See, e.g., Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, (Nov. 19, 
1999); Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 130 (Sept. 8, 
2005); Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134 (Sept. 15, 2005), 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_134_ing.pdf 
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content to the definition of the family unit protected under the 
ACHR.  Outside the scope of LGBTI rights, there are at least two 
areas in which the IACtHR has contributed to shaping family law 
institutions in the region.  The richest area of development and 
perhaps one of the least analyzed is children’s rights.  The IACtHR 
has also decided several cases related to justice within the family 
and cases related to gender equality and the family. 
1. Children’s Rights 
The most notable actions by the IACtHR in this area are the 
Advisory Opinion 17 (OC-17/2002) on children’s rights, and cases 
of children separated from their families.65  OC-17/2002 was a 
groundbreaking opinion on children’s rights issued by the IACtHR 
in 2002 at the request of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights 66  The IACHR asked the Court to interpret Articles 8 and 25 
of the American Convention, “with the aim of determining whether 
the special measures set forth in Article 19 of that same Convention 
establish[ed] ‘limits to the good judgment and discretion of the 
States with respect to children . . . .’”67 
 
[https://perma.cc/HD8L-YNX4]; Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148 
(July 1, 2006), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_148_ing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XYU7-K5FM]; Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panamá, Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193 
(Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_193_ing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6RLQ-P5FY]; Case of Escher et al. v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 208 (July 6, 
2009), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_200_ing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9Z66-B4YY]; Case of Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala, Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 212 
(May 25, 2010), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_212_ing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EJL9-N3UK]; Rosendo Cantú et al. v. México, Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations, and Cost, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216, (Aug. 31, 
2010), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_216_ing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3FFB-BPE4]; Case Gelman v. Uruguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 221 (Feb. 24, 2011), 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_221_ing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UB6V-HUQ8]. 
 65 Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion OC-17/02, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 17 (Aug. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-
17/02], available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_17_ing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4363-2V3G]. 
 66 Id. at ¶ 1. 
 67 Id. 
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Several interpretations came out of OC-17/2002 with major 
implications for the family that would later develop through case 
law.  In this Opinion, the IACtHR indicated that it was a state’s 
obligation “to support the family in performing its natural function 
of providing protection to the children who are members of the 
family.”68  This mandate does not explain the type of family to be 
protected or define “members of the family.”69  OC-17/02 refers to 
the family “as a natural and fundamental component of society.”70  
It also states that “the child must remain in his or her household, 
unless there are determining reasons, based on the child’s best 
interests, to decide to separate him or her from the family.”71  This 
statement, however, did not shed light on the type of association that 
the Court considered a family unit.  In 2012, the first case on sexual 
orientation, Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile (Atala),72 the 
IACtHR broadly interpreted the family unit protected by the ACHR, 
including unmarried and non-heterosexual families.73 
Other IACtHR decisions reinforce the protection of the single-
parent family formed outside marriage.  In Forneron and Daughter 
v. Argentina,74 the Court stated that being a single parent was not an 
impediment to raising a family.75  It stated that “[t]here is nothing to 
indicate that single-parent families cannot provide children with 
care, support and affection.  Every day, the reality shows that not 
every family has a maternal or paternal figure, and this does not 
prevent the family from providing the necessary well-being for a 
child’s development.”76 
 
 68 Id. ¶ 53. 
 69 See id. 
 70 Id. ¶ 66. 
 71 See Advisory Opinion OC-17/02, supra note 65, ¶ 77. 
 72 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile (Atala v. Chile), Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 239, (Feb. 24, 2012), 
http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_239_ing.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2QJ-
MR3H]. 
 73 See infra Section III.A. 
 74 Forneron and Daughter v. Argentina (Forneron v. Argentina), Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 242, (Apr. 27, 2012), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_242_ing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DCD2-N5QS]. 
 75 See id. ¶ 96. 
 76 Id. ¶ 98. 
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2. Fighting Patriarchal Family Structures 
The ACHR is the first line of defense against the patriarchal 
family.  Article 17.4 states that countries must take measures to 
ensure equality of rights between spouses in marriage.77  Outside 
marriage, however, there is no express mandate for families to 
enforce principles of equality and non-discrimination within the 
family.78  Thus, the family could be, and often is, a space for human 
rights violations.  There is, however, enough case law from the 
IACtHR and reports from the IACHR to state that the Inter-
American system has contributed to understandings of the family 
based on equality among its members.  These understandings of 
equality within the family do not derive from Article 17 of the 
ACHR, but from the right to equal protection recognized in Article 
24, and the Obligation to Respect Rights of Article 1.1.79  If a family 
structure affects the right to equality of its members, or affects any 
other right recognized by the ACHR or other international 
instruments, a State Party may be violating its international 
obligations.80  Equality within the family, however, requires 
fighting structural inequalities that affect women beyond the 
confines of the household, including the pervasive use of sexual 
violence against women as an instrument of subordination. 
The IACHR started functioning in 1959 and in 1965 the OAS 
expanded its mandate to include review of individual petitions.81  
The IACHR reviewed its first petitions in 1967.82  Even though 
women were mentioned as victims in some of the cases, and there 
 
 77 ACHR, supra note 8,  at art. 17.4. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at art. 1.1, art. 24. 
 80 Id. at pmbl. 
 81 Organization of American States, Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, Santiago, Chile, Final Act, Aug. 12-18, 1959, Doc. OEA/Ser. C/VIII, 
http://www.oas.org/council/MEETINGS%20OF%20CONSULTATION/Actas/Acta%20
5.pdf [https://perma.cc/86ZC-EAGU]; OAS, Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers 




 82 ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS STRATEGIC PLAN 2011-2015 37, 
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/pdf/IACHRStrategicPlan20112015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K2QR-HMJ2]. 
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were issues that today would be considered gender-specific, for 
many years the human rights narrative did not include issues of 
gender and sexuality.  By the late 1990s, there was some 
acknowledgment that governments could be responsible for sexual 
violence, but it took until the 2000s for the system to hold 
governments accountable for human rights violations against 
women.83  Loayza Tamayo v. Peru84 illustrates how difficult it was 
for the IACtHR to understand rape as a human rights violation.85  In 
that case, the claimant was a woman who had been illegally detained 
and tortured by the intelligence police of Peru in 1993.86  This 
torture included several instances of rape.87  The Court decided the 
case in 1997 and despite having the same evidence about the acts of 
torture, including her repeated rape, the Court reached the 
conclusion that “after examination of the file and, given the nature 
of this fact, the accusation [of rape] could not be substantiated.88  
However, the other facts alleged, such as incommunicado 
detention, . . . blows and maltreatment, . . . all constitute forms of 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment . . . .”89 
The IACtHR had the same evidence for all the harms suffered 
by Loayza (witness testimonies and the victim’s account), but found 
them credible in the case of gender-neutral harms and not credible, 
“given the nature of [the] fact,” when it came to rape.90  The IACtHR 
did not explain what the nature of the fact was, even though the use 
of rape as an instrument of torture against women was well known 
then, even though less analyzed and theorized than now.91 
 
 83 Raquel Martin de Mejía v. Perú, Case 10.970, Inter-Am. Commission H.R., Report 
No. 5/96, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91, doc. 7, at 168 (1996), available at 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/cases/1996/peru5-96.htm [https://perma.cc/D8PP-JVUN] 
(acknowledging that rape could be a form of torture). 
 84 Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 33, (Sept. 17, 1997), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_33_ing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DK3D-24F4]. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. ¶ 3. 
 87 Id. 
88  Id. 
 89 Id. ¶ 58 (emphasis added). 
 90 See Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, at id.  
 91 See Patricia Palacios Zuloaga, The Path to Gender Justice in the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 227, 236 (2008). 
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Two of the first reports on merits issued by the Inter-American 
Commission specific to women’s harms were Maria Eugenia 
Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala92 and Maria da Penha v. Brazil;93 
both occurred in 2001.  The first case was a challenge to 
Guatemala’s Civil Code, which gave a husband the right to 
authorize or deny his wife permission to work outside the house 
when he provided enough income and had “sufficiently justified 
reasons.”94  Guatemala’s Constitutional Court had found the legal 
provision constitutional, based on the need to protect “the wife in 
her role as mother, and protect the children.”95  The IACHR stated 
that the legal consequence of the provision was “to deny married 
women their legal autonomy.”96 
The second case conceptualized domestic violence as a human 
rights violation and the IACHR, for the first time, used the Inter-
American Convention on The Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of Violence Against Women (Convention of Belem do 
Para).97  The result in Maria da Penha v. Brazil98  marks the moment 
when the IASHR started to develop human rights standards 
regarding violence and discrimination against women.99  It also 
initiated the practice of holding governments accountable for the 
lack of effective response to gender-based violence.  The case 
triggered the passing of a new domestic violence statute in Brazil 
named after the petitioner in the case.100 
After these cases, which marked the first time the Inter-
 
 92 Maria Eugenia Morales De Sierra Guatemala v. Guatemala (Morales v. 
Guatemala), Inter-Am. Commission H.R., Report No. 28/98, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 
rev. (2001). 
 93 Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
54/01, OEASer.L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev 704 (2001). 
 94 See Morales v. Guatemala, ¶ 28. 
 95 Id. ¶ 35. 
 96 Id. ¶ 38. 
 97 Paula Spieler, The Maria da Penha Case and the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights: Contributions to the Debate on Domestic Violence Against Women in 
Brazil, 18 IND. J. OF GLOB. LEGAL STUD., 1, 122 (2011). 
 98 See Maria da Penha v. Brazil. 
 99 See id. 
 100 On August 7, 2006, Brazil passed Law 11.340, better known as “ley Maria da 
Penha.” See Pablo Uchoa, Maria da Penha: The woman who changed Brazil’s domestic 
violence laws, BBC BRASIL (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-
37429051 [https://perma.cc/JRV9-4LRG]. 
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American system analyzed human rights thinking of harms suffered 
specifically by women, both the Commission and the Court 
developed a nuanced understanding of the role that gender 
stereotypes play in human rights violations.  In González et al. 
(“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico,101 the IACtHR not only referred to the 
structural issue of violence against women but also introduced the 
concept of gender stereotyping in the Inter-American system.102  In 
that decision, the IACtHR talked about inequality between men and 
women and referred to the problem of subordination of women.103  
It also stated that “[t]he creation and use of stereotypes becomes one 
of the causes and consequences of gender-based violence against 
women.”104  After Cotton Field the Inter-American system has often 
analyzed the role that gender stereotypes play in cases of violence 
and discrimination against women.105 
The Inter-American Commission came to a similar conclusion 
in Jessica Lenahan (Gonzalez) et.al. v. United States.106  There, the 
obligation to take measures to prevent domestic violence derived 
from the American Declaration, but the reasoning in both Merits 
Reports was very similar.107 
These reports were the beginning of a new era in the relationship 
between the family and human rights.  They confirmed there is no 
area of human behavior shielded from a human rights framework.108  
They also clarified that international obligations required more than 
just the commitment to do no harm from countries.109  This is 
instrumental for gender equality, especially within the family, as it 
 
 101 González et al. v. Mexico (“Cotton Field”), Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 205 (Nov. 16, 2009). 
 102 Id. ¶¶ 401–402. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 See e.g., Artavia Murillo et al. (“in vitro fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257 
(Nov. 28, 2012); see also Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile (Atala v. Chile), Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239 (Feb. 24, 2012). 
 106 Lenahan (Gonzalez) et al. v. United States, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 80/11 (July 21, 2011). 
 107 Id. 
 108 See id.; see also González et al. v. Mexico (“Cotton Field”), Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 205 
(Nov. 16, 2009). 
 109 See id. 
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forces countries to face domestic violence as not a private problem, 
but a structural issue partly due to impunity and an ineffective 
response by the justice system.  Although even at a slower pace than 
the IASHR, the European system has responded in a similar manner 
to domestic violence, with its first decision on the topic in 2008.110 
III. LGBTI Rights Enter the Inter-American System of 
Human Rights 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the European system of Human Rights 
analyzed cases regarding both sexual orientation111 and gender 
identity (SOGI).112  The IASHR, on the contrary, did not decide any 
cases related to violence or discrimination based on SOGI until 
2010, when the IACHR issued its report against Chile for the 
discrimination of Judge Karen Atala and her daughters based on her 
sexual orientation.113  Two years later, the IACtHR decided in favor 
of Judge Atala, declaring sexual orientation and gender identity 
protected categories under the ACHR.114  The rights of LGBTI 
individuals became a core part of the system in 2011, when the 
IACHR created a special unit to strengthen the Commission’s 
capacity to protect LGBTI rights.115  In 2014, the IACHR created a 
Rapporteurship on LGBTI right.116 
 
 110 See Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 71127/01, 2008 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on 
H.R. 44 (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 111 See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 149 (ser. B) (1982); Norris v. 
Ireland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 186 (1988); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 EUR. CT. OF HUM RTS. (ser. 
A) (1993). See Homosexuality: Criminal Aspects Factsheet, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS (2014), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Homosexuality_ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5UVS-4MSN]. 
 112 Regarding gender identity, the first case was Rees v. United Kingdom and it was 
decided against the plaintiff in 1986.  The first successful case for a plaintiff on issues of 
gender identity came in 2002, in Goodwin v. United Kingdom.  See Gender Identity Issues 
Factsheet, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2018), 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Gender_identity_ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9CS2-UN58]; see also Sexual Orientation Issues Factsheet, EUR. CT. OF 
HUM RTS.  (2018), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Sexual_orientation_ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/39LY-T4BN]. 
 113 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile (Atala v. Chile), Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 239, (Feb. 24, 2012). 
 114 Id. 
 115 See Rapporteurship on the Rights of LGBTI Persons, ORGANIZATION OF 
AMERICAN STATES (2011), http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/lgtbi/default.asp 
[https://perma.cc/FG84-M4FQ]. 
 116 See id. 
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A.  The First Cases on LGBT Rights and the Family 
Atala117 is the groundbreaking case on sexual orientation before 
the Inter-American system.  The decision indirectly contributed to 
developing a new understanding of the family from an Inter-
American human rights framework.  It was not about Judge Atala 
and her right to be with her children but about the children and their 
right to be with their mother, and not with a mother that fit imposed 
standards of motherhood.118  This reasoning is not just about same-
sex couples, but non-traditional families in general.  Its reasoning 
can also extend to protecting the rights of parents who do not fit the 
stereotypical roles of mother and father from gender, socio-
economic, cultural, and religious perspectives.  One of the main 
problems of the best interest of the child principle is that it invites 
judges to compare a child’s reality with an ideal scenario that few 
are in position to provide.119  Thus, single parents in low socio-
economic environments are measured against an unrealistic 
standard.  Equally, a mother that does not fit the ideal preconceived 
notions of motherhood may suffer from discrimination—hidden 
under the malleable principle of the best interest of the child. 
In Atala, the Supreme Court of Chile (SCC) used the best 
interest of the child principle to discriminate against a mother who 
did not fit the majority of the SCC justices’ definition of the “good 
mother.”120  In 2002, Ms. Atala separated from her husband and 
assumed her sexual orientation.121  The husband and Ms. Atala 
agreed that she would live with their three young children, and he 
would visit them regularly.122  This arrangement lasted until Ms. 
Atala fell in love with a woman who moved into Ms. Atala’s 
house.123  The father filed for custody of the three girls.124  According 
to the Supreme Court’s decision, the father argued that “the decision 
adopted by the mother following her homosexual tendency harms 
 
 117 See Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239. 
 118 See id. 
 119 See e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and Child 
Custody: The Puzzling Persistence of the Best-Interests Standard, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 69, 71–72 (2014). 
 120 See Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239. 
 121 Id. ¶ 30. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. ¶ 31. 
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the psychical integral development and social environment of the 
three minors; that the interest of her daughters makes necessary to 
preempt the pernicious consequences that being raised under the 
care of a homosexual partner will trigger.”125  The claim was not 
that Ms. Atala or her partner were directly harming the girls.  The 
argument was simply that a lesbian woman had to choose between 
being a mother and being lesbian, as if motherhood was essentially 
heterosexual.126  This argument resonated with the lower court judge 
who granted an injunction to give temporary custody of the girls to 
the husband, stating that “the [father] offers more favorable 
arguments on behalf of the best interest of the girls, which in the 
context of a heterosexual and traditional society take on great 
importance.”127 
Ms. Atala eventually won the custody battle, but the Supreme 
Court overturned the final decision through an extraordinary writ 
using similar arguments as the lower court against Ms. Atala.128  The 
Court’s decision to separate the girls from their mother did not relate 
to anything Ms. Atala or her partner had done to the children.  The 
Supreme Court punished Ms. Atala for not conforming to the 
specific behavior these judges assigned to the “good mother.”  The 
SCC stated that by living with a lesbian partner, Ms. Atala had 
chosen her own desires over the well-being of her daughters.129  In 
the Supreme Court Justices’ opinion, Ms. Atala would have been a 
“good mother” by living alone or living with a male partner.130  For 
this arbitrary opinion to be legal, they used the principle of the best 
interest of the child as a shield. 
In Atala, the IACtHR reinforced important principles against the 
patriarchal family.  First, it confirmed that the ACHR protects not 
only the married family but also de facto family ties.131  Second, it 
stated that the “the girls’ alleged need to grow up in a ‘normally 
structured family that is appreciated within its social environment,’ 
and not in an ‘exceptional family,’ reflects a limited, stereotyped 
perception of the concept of family, which has no basis in the 
 
 125 Id. ¶ 53. 
 126 Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, at id. 
 127 Id. ¶ 141. 
 128 See id. 
 129 Id. ¶ 56. 
 130 Id. ¶ 141. 
 131 Id. ¶ 142. 
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Convention, since there is no specific model of family.”132  Third, it 
provided content against the best interest of the child principle, 
rejecting the idea that each person using this principle could define 
what is best for children according to their own opinions.133  The 
IACtHR stated that: 
 
[T]he determination of the child’s best interest in cases involving 
the care and custody of minors must be based on an assessment 
of specific parental behaviors and their negative impact on the 
well-being and development of the child, or of any real and 
proven damage or risks to the child’s well-being and not those 
that are speculative or imaginary.  Therefore, speculations, 
assumptions, stereotypes, or generalized considerations regarding 
the parents’ personal characteristics or cultural preferences 
regarding the family’s traditional concepts are not admissible.134 
 
It is interesting to note that the first cases on sexual orientation 
before the European and Universal systems of human rights were 
about anti-sodomy statutes.135  Without dismissing the obstacles 
faced by the litigants in these cases, they were challenging anti-
sodomy statutes that both the UK and Australia were rarely 
enforcing and in places where people did not actively persecute 
same-sex couples.136  The Human Rights Committee and the ECHR 
decided these cases focusing primarily on the right to privacy, 
providing a small opening for gradual changes in both systems.137  
The IASHR, instead, had to analyze whether sexual orientation was 
a protected category under the ACHR by delving into a family law 
case where sexual orientation was the fundamental factor used to 
decide the custody of three young children.138  Privacy would not be 
enough to argue this case since it required an analysis of the 
 
 132 See Atala v. Chile, (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 145. 
 133 Id. ¶ 110. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 149 (ser. B) (1982); Toonen v. 
Australia, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (Apr. 4, 1994). 
 136 Giulia Dondoli, LGBTI Activism Influencing Foreign Legislation, 16 MELB. J. 
INT’L L. 124, 131–34 (2015). 
 137 See id. at 133. 
 138 See Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile (Atala v. Chile), Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 239, (Feb. 24, 2012). 
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international law principle of the best interest of the child.139  The 
fact that very young children were at the center of the dispute did 
not make things easier.  This was a difficult “first case” because it 
touched on the family, a sphere often considered outside the reach 
of legal systems.140  Fortunately, the IACtHR understood that courts 
cannot use the best interest of the child as a tool to discriminate 
against parents based on their sexual orientation.141  Instead of a 
small opening for gradual change, Atala created a wide opening for 
sexual orientation human rights litigation.  The decision left the 
door open to expand the right to family to associations formed 
outside the legal marriage, both by heterosexual and same-sex 
partners.  The Atala case had a domino effect in Latin America, with 
local courts citing it as justification for their own decisions 
regarding different issues related to sexual orientation and gender 
identity, including marriage equality and second parent adoption of 
same-sex couples.142 
B.  The Next Cases: More on the Family and More on 
Discrimination 
Before 2004, when the Atala case started, there were two 
submissions related to sexual orientation.  The first petition 
regarding sexual orientation was submitted in 1999, but did not have 
a Merits Report until 2014.143  Marta Lucía Álvarez Giraldo, a 
lesbian woman serving a long prison sentence in Colombia, filed a 
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petition in 1996 arguing that Colombia discriminated against 
lesbian inmates by denying them the right to intimate visits that 
heterosexual inmates enjoyed.144  From the Merits Report, it seems 
that the case was inactive until 2009.145  In 2014, the IACHR Merits 
Report concluded that Colombia violated Ms. Alvarez’ rights and 
discriminated against her on the basis of her sexual orientation.146  
Although the IACHR did not elaborate on the concept of family in 
its Merits Report, it was clear that it did not see Ms. Alvarez’ denial 
of intimate visits just as a violation of privacy.  The IACHR stated 
that the right to intimate visits was an essential requirement to 
ensure the integrity and freedom of inmates and, as a consequence, 
the protection of the right to family.147  This case reinforced the idea 
in Atala that the right to family is not tied to heterosexuality or legal 
marriage. 
In 2002, the IACHR received a petition against Ecuador for the 
military discharge of Homero Flor Freire, based on accusations of 
engaging in homosexual acts, prohibited by the Ecuadorian 
military.148  The IACtHR issued a decision against Ecuador in 2016.  
Mr. Flor Freire argued that he had not engaged in “homosexual 
conduct.”149  The Court, relying on the standards developed in Atala, 
used the case to expand on the concept of anti-discrimination to 
include discrimination for the perceived sexual orientation.150  It 
also reinforced the prohibition of treating sexual acts between 
individuals of the same sex different to acts between individuals of 
different sex.151  Equality of treatment should apply in all contexts, 
including the military.152 
In 2005, the IACHR received a third petition regarding sexual 
orientation and the family.153  In this case, Angel Alberto Duque 
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claimed that Colombia had denied him a survivor’s pension because 
his deceased partner was a man.154  Angel Alberto Duque v. 
Colombia155 became the second case on sexual orientation to reach 
the IACtHR, and Duque obtained a favorable decision.156  By then, 
it was undeniable that the ACHR protected the family—including 
those formed by same-sex partners. 
In 2012, right after the IACtHR issued its Atala decision, six 
same-sex couples supported by an LGBT organization in Chile filed 
a petition arguing discrimination due to the lack of marriage 
equality in Chile.157  The case ended with a friendly settlement in 
which the government of Chile promised to advance in the 
recognition of LGBTI rights, supporting a bill on marriage 
equality.158  By 2018, the system had not reviewed the merits of any 
cases on marriage equality. 
Except for the case of Mr. Flor Freire, which expanded the 
concept of equality to include discrimination for the perceived 
sexual orientation, the cases reviewed by the IASHR have focused 
on the right to family diversity.159  The advantage of this line of 
cases is that it forced the system to develop a strong anti-
discrimination standard, instead of confining LGBTI rights to the 
narrower field of privacy.  The disadvantage is that the system has 
not focused its case law on issues of violence against LGBTI people, 
especially trans people.  The IACHR received its first case on 
violence based on SOGI in 2009.160  The case of Azul Rojas Marin 
refers to one of the most common forms of violence against trans 
people: police brutality, including sexual violence against a person 
targeted for her gender identity.161  The development of standards to 
protect individuals from violence based on SOGI is beyond the 
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scope of this Article.  There can be, however, no right to family 
when people live their lives with the constant fear of being the target 
of violence due to their actual or perceived sexual orientation and 
gender identity. 
C.  The IACtHR Advisory Opinion on LGBTI Rights 
On May 2016, Costa Rica requested the IACtHR to issue an 
Advisory Opinion (AO) regarding the interpretation and reach of 
Articles 11.2 (protection of privacy and he family), 18 (right to a 
legal name), and 24 (equality) in relation to Article 1 (obligation to 
respect rights and principle of non-discrimination) of the ACHR.162  
Specifically, Costa Rica requested the IACtHR to elaborate on: (1) 
the protection those rights provide to individuals based on their 
gender identity; (2) the compatibility of a specific provision of the 
Cosa Rican Civil Code with the ACHR when individuals requested 
a change of legal name based on their gender identity; and (3) the 
protection of the ACHR to property rights (derechos de 
propiedades) derived from a same-sex relationship.163 
Based on these three main issues, Costa Rica requested the 
IACtHR to answer five specific questions.164  Three questions 
related to gender identity and access to a procedure to change the 
legal name and the last two related to the recognition of property 
rights derived of same-sex relations.165 
1. Trans Rights and the Family 
The Costa Rican government’s questions regarding the 
protection of trans individuals were not related to the trans family.166  
They targeted the most basic problem trans individuals face around 
the world.  When trans individuals cannot change their legal name 
and identity cards according to their self-perceived gender identity, 
they are forced to out themselves as trans and are exposed to 
violence and discrimination.167  Trans people have difficulty 
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securing employment or have their political rights violated because 
their physical appearance does not match their legal identity.168  
Lack of access to the legal identity that matches a person’s gender 
identity also has an impact in family formation and the protection 
of trans children.169  An accessible, easy, and fast legal name change 
process is the starting point to the recognition of trans individuals 
as citizens and also as family members. 
In the AO, the IACtHR analyzed the right to a person’s gender 
identity under the ACHR.  It stated that the right to identity 
encompasses several rights and it relates to dignity, privacy, and 
autonomy.170  The IACtHR added that gender identity is linked to 
the concept of liberty and self-determination.171  One of the most 
important elements of the AO is the recognition of gender identity 
as “the internal and individual gender experience as each individual 
feels it, which can correspond or not with the assigned sex at 
birth.”172  The recognition of gender identity as an essential aspect 
of an individual’s autonomy puts all models of medicalization and 
pathologization of gender identity at odds with the ACHR and 
should be a strong incentive for countries to end harmful practices 
against trans individuals.173  The IACtHR stated that requiring 
medical exams or certifications “contributes to perpetuating 
prejudices associated to the binary construction of the masculine 
and feminine gender.”174 
The right to have and to change one’s legal name, therefore, is 
directly tied to the right to one’s identity.175  Governments must have 
procedures in place that do not hinder a person’s right to his or her 
 
 168 Council of Eur. Comm’n Human Rights, Human Rights and Gender Identity, Doc. 
No. CommDH/IssuePaper(2009)2, at 7 (July 29, 2009). 
169 For general challenges, see Shannon Price Minter, Transgender Family Law, 56 
FAM. CT. REV. 410 (2018); see also, Katherine A. Kuvalanka et al., An Exploratory Study 
of Custody Challenges Experienced by Affirming Mothers of Transgender and Gender-
Nonconforming Children, 57 FAM. CT. REV. 54, 56 (2019) (examining how courts have 
taken custody away from parents who support the child’s gender identity) 
 170 Advisory Opinion AO-24/17, supra note 7, ¶ 90. 
 171 Id. ¶ 93. 
 172 Id. ¶ 101.f. 
 173 See Emma Inch, Changing Minds: The Psycho-Pathologization of Trans People, 
45 INT’L J. OF MENTAL HEALTH 193, 193–204 (2016) (discussing how pathologization of 
trans people has been extremely harmful). 
 174 Advisory Opinion AO-24/17, supra note 7, ¶ 130; INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 167, ¶ 419. 
      175 Id. 
344 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLIV 
legal name.176  These processes, according to the IACtHR, must be 
based exclusively on the free and informed consent of the person 
who requests the change of their legal name.177  The IACtHR also 
stated that these procedures should be expeditious and, if possible, 
free of charge.178 
The IACtHR also referred to child’s right to change their legal 
name to match their gender identity.179  Consistent with its case law, 
the Court stated that children are entitled to the same rights as adults 
under the ACHR.180  The Court stated that children have a right to 
progressive autonomy, and that all children’s rights must be 
protected by using the best interest of the child as a paramount 
consideration.181  The IACtHR understands the role that parents play 
in the development of children.  The legal system, however, must 
respect the progressive autonomy of children and promote judicial 
bypass mechanisms when parents disagree with their child’s desire 
to change her legal name.182   
Prior to AO-24/17, Costa Rican law categorically did not allow 
legal name changes based on gender identity.183  According to civil 
society organizations, transgender individuals are systematically 
mistreated and discriminated against when attempting to change 
their legal names.184  Soon after the AO was issued, the Supreme 
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Tribunal of Elections (Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones),185 in 
charge of regulating the Identification Registry, informed Costa 
Ricans that they would have access to an easy administrative 
process for the change of a legal name.186  In less than a year after 
the release of the AO, more than 300 people had changed their legal 
name to coincide with their gender identity.187 
2. Same-Sex Families: From Patrimonial Rights to Full 
Recognition 
The last two questions Costa Rica issued to the IACtHR related 
to the recognition of patrimonial rights derived from same-sex 
relations.188  The IACtHR pointed out that Costa Rica had not 
specified the type of same-sex relations that it was aiming to protect 
through its questions, so the Court took the opportunity to reinforce 
the recognition by the ACHR of non-heterosexual relationships.189  
It stated, “in general terms, the rights derived from affective 
relations between couples, are usually subject to and protected by 
the Convention through the institute of the family and family 
life.”190 
Even though the questions were specific to property rights, the 
IACtHR considered that it could not answer without elaborating on 
“whether affectionate relations between individuals of the same sex 
could be considered as ‘family’ in the terms of the Convention.”191  
This section of the AO-24/17 refers several times to Atala,192  
however, that decision did not establish a specific concept of the 
family.  This was the opportunity for the IACtHR to expand on the 
family as a concept that changes throughout time.193  The Court used 
an unfortunate example to illustrate this evolution by referring to 
the differentiated treatment of legitimate and illegitimate 
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children,194 a distinction that the Inter-American system has rejected 
since its origins.195  The IACtHR gave a better example, citing  a 
prior Advisory Opinion on the rights of migrant children.196  It stated 
that families can  include not only parents and children but also the 
extended family and individuals who care for children without 
having biological ties. 197  This statement recognizes the reality of 
Latin America, a region in which marriage has been scattered and 
families are socially conceived in more complex and porous ways 
than what legal systems usually recognize.198 
The IACtHR explained the meaning of Article 17.2 of the 
ACHR refers to the right of a man and a woman to get married and 
have a family.199  It stated that such definition “would not be 
formulating a restrictive definition of how marriage must be 
understood or how a family must be founded.  For this Court, Article 
17.2 would only be establishing an expressed conventional 
protection of one particular form of marriage.”200  For the Court 
“this would not necessarily mean this may be the only type of family 
protected by the American Convention.”201 
The IACtHR used this Opinion to set specific guidance for 
future decisions on family associations.  It started with an analysis 
of the type of protections that would be acceptable under the ACHR, 
and ended with a very specific statement that anything short of 
marriage equality would be unacceptable under the ACHR.202  First, 
The IACtHR stated that the ACHR required countries to recognize 
families formed by same-sex couples.203  The Court could have 
ended its analysis here and encouraged countries to provide equal 
protection and rights to married and unmarried families.  Instead, 
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the Court analyzed the status of marriage and other models of 
formal recognition of same-sex couples around the region. It 
concluded that extending marriage to same-sex couples would be 
the simplest and most efficient way of ensuring rights to same-sex 
couples.204  From that conclusion, the Court goes on to state that it 
would actually be discriminatory to deny the protection of marriage 
to same-sex couples.205  Furthermore, the Court stated that countries 
must change their regulations and expand the right to marriage to 
same-sex couples.206  In the meantime, the IACtHR stated, as a 
transitory measure same-sex couples who don’t have access to legal 
marriage should be afforded the same rights of married couples.207 
3. The Role of Advisory Opinions and the Impact of AO-
24/17 in Latin America: A Word of Caution 
Article 64.1 of the ACHR states that “member states of the 
Organization may consult the Court regarding the interpretation of 
this Convention or of other treaties concerning the protection of 
human rights in the American states.”208   Advisory Opinions (AOs) 
are “designed to assist states and organs to comply with and to apply 
human rights treaties without subjecting them to the formalism and 
the sanctions associated with the contentious judicial process.”209 
The advisory role of the IACtHR can be very influential in allowing 
the Court to provide general interpretations of international law.210 
Though non-binding even for the country requesting the Court’s 
opinion, AOs are a great source of consistency and uniformity in the 
interpretation of the rights protected.211   
In this case, with no obligation to do so, Costa Rica decided to 
follow the guidance of the Court.212  Even though AOs trigger no 
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legal obligations, the Supreme Court of Costa Rica interpreted the 
Opinion as binding for Costa Rica.213   This was an important gain 
for the government of Costa Rica, who requested the Opinion of the 
Court while pushing for more protections for LGBTI individuals in 
the country.214  The Opinion gave the government international 
support to advance in this area.215 
Despite its non-binding effect, once AO-24/17 was issued, 
media outlets around the region announced that the IACtHR had 
ordered all countries in the region to expand marriage to same-sex 
couples.216  News outlets mentioned that the Court referred to trans 
rights, but the talk of the town was marriage equality.217  The 
opportunity to focus on trans adults and children’s rights was gone. 
Marriage equality took all of the attention.  
The Court’s Opinion was issued a few weeks before Costa 
Rica’s presidential election.218  Until then, the electoral process was 
moving with few controversies, with 13 candidates running to 
become the frontrunners in a second round.219  Among the 
candidates, an evangelical preacher had reached no more than 2% 
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changed the course of the election and marriage equality became the 
battlefield for deciding the presidential election.221  Fabricio 
Alvarado, an evangelical preacher and singer, whose wife was also 
an evangelical pastor, went from being a candidate with no chance 
to win, to the frontrunner for the presidency on a platform that 
rejected AO-24/17 and marriage equality.222  Fabricio Alvarado won 
the majority in the first round of the presidential election with 24.7% 
of the votes, followed by moderate center-left candidate Carlos 
Alvarado with 21.74% of the votes.223  As part of his platform, 
Fabricio Alvarado promised to call a referendum for the withdrawal 
of Costa Rica from the Inter-American System of Human Rights.224 
After weeks of tension, the country backed Carlos Alvarado, the 
candidate who ran on a moderate political platform and respect for 
human rights.225  Carlos Alvarado obtained more than 60% of the 
popular vote, and Fabricio Alvarado captured 39.2% of the 
ballots.226  As stated in The Washington Post, however, “Fabricio 
Alvarado’s surprising rise highlighted the growing power of 
socially conservative and evangelical voters in the small Central 
American country.”227 
Parallel to the backlash that AO 24/17 had on the Costa Rican 
presidential election, Costa Rican courts were deciding challenges 
to the Costa Rican legislation regarding marriage equality.228  The 
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Supreme Tribunal of Elections sent the issue to the Constitutional 
Chamber of the Costa Rican Supreme Court.  On August 8, 2018, 
the Supreme Court issued its first decision on marriage equality, 
ordering Congress to regulate marriage equality within a timeframe 
of 18 months.229  This is similar to the Constitutional Court of 
Colombia’s 2016 decision that led to chaos on marriage regulation 
for two years.230  The decision of the Costa Rican Supreme Court 
relied on international human rights law, citing Atala231 and AO-
24/17.232  It declared both the lack of regulation on same-sex 
marriage and lack of recognition of de facto same-sex couples 
unconstitutional.233  However, the decision, similar to the IACtHR’s 
AO 24/17, does not state that de facto couples should be entitled to 
the same treatment and protection as married couples.  
IV. Conclusion 
Since its origins, the IASHR has focused on protecting the most 
vulnerable groups.  It advanced the protection of the non-traditional 
families through the recognition of equality between children born 
in and outside marriage. The drafters of the ACHR seem to have 
had a broader idea of the family than the drafters of the ECHR and 
the UDHR.  The IASHR’s case law has strengthened the protection 
of women’s rights, advanced gender equality and even mandated 
countries to incorporate gender perspectives into their trainings for 
judges and police forces.  Likewise, the system has been at the 
forefront of recognizing equality and family diversity based on 
sexual orientation and gender identity through a strong and 
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consistent jurisprudence that started with Atala234 and continued 
with Duque v. Colombia235  and Flor Freire v. Ecuador.236  These 
cases were based the protection of LGBT individuals on principles 
of equality and non-discrimination, escaping the fate of a European 
system that has struggled to move LGBT rights away from the right 
to privacy, towards a recognition of family diversity through the 
equality principle.  AO 24/17 gave the IACtHR the opportunity to 
analyze the right to equality of trans individuals and the rights of 
same-sex couples.237  Human rights and LGBTI rights activists from 
around the world have rightly welcomed AO-24/17.  Its impact was 
immediate, with Costa Rica altering its legal name change 
regulations for trans individuals, and the Supreme Court issuing a 
pro-marriage equality decision.238  At the same time, a strong focus 
on marriage equality runs the risk of furthering the marginalization 
of individuals who do not have access to marriage for reasons 
unrelated to sexual orientation and gender identity.  Discrimination 
in housing, work, and health services may not change because same-
sex couples have access to marriage.  More complicated yet, access 
to marriage for same-sex couples does not create equality of 
treatment for unmarried heterosexual and same-sex couples. 
The Opinion’s strong focus on marriage equality runs two 
important risks.  On one hand, while it may have led to Costa Rica’s 
marriage equality decision by Costa Rica’s Supreme Court, the 
backlash almost led to a President ready to denounce the IASHR, 
energizing anti LGBT activists in the region.239  At this time, it is 
impossible to know the real political impact of this Opinion.  
Second, as welcoming of marriage equality as the Opinion is as a 
matter of principle, there is a risk for countries to use AO 24/17 to 
maintain, if not to deepen, the difference of treatment between 
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married and unmarried families.  The more countries focus on 
regulating marriage, the more the situation of the most vulnerable 
families in the region remains untouched.  Trans families, single-
parent households, and de facto couples exist in parallel to married 
families.  All these groups are part of the family landscape of the 
region.  These groups become more relevant when statistics show 
that marriage, both heterosexual and same-sex, is an institution 
more prominent among middle and upper middle classes.240 
The region needs more cases before the Inter-American system 
to defeat regulations that still recognize men as heads of households 
and regulations that leave unmarried families unprotected.  The 
region would benefit if the IACtHR would review cases that 
recognize the functional family as protected by the ACHR.  In Latin 
America and the Caribbean, non-biological child caregivers lack 
rights when compared with biological families.241 
Equality within the family and recognition of family diversity 
are among the most important contributions of the IASHR to 
developing family frameworks in the region, and there is still much 
space for growth in both areas.  Just as the origins of the IASHR had 
in mind the protection of illegitimate children as some of the most 
vulnerable members of families, the new cases and reports must 
keep identifying the most vulnerable members of the family at 
different times and places.  
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